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Abstract—The number of Android smartphone and tablet
users has experienced a rapid growth in the past few years
and it raises users’ awareness on the privacy and security of
their mobile devices. The features of openness and extensibility
make Android unique, attractive and competitive but meanwhile
vulnerable to malicious attack. There are lots of users rooting
their Android devices for some useful functions, which are not
originally provided to developers and users, such as backup
and taking screenshot. However, after observing the danger of
rooting devices, the developers begin to look for other non-root
alternatives to implement those functions. ADB workaround is
one of the best known non-root alternatives to help app gain
higher privilege on Android. It used to be considered as a secure
practice until some cases of ADB privilege leakage have been
found. In this project, we design an approach and implement a
couple of tools to detect the privilege leakage in Android apps.
We apply them to analyse three real-world apps with millions
of users, and successfully identify three ADB privilege leaks
from them. Moreover, we also conduct an exploitation of the
ADB privilege in one app, and therefore we prove the existence
of vulnerabilities in ADB workaround. Based on out study, we
propose some suggestion to help developers create their apps that
could not only satisfy users’ needs but also protect users’ privacy
from similar attacks in future.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of mobile devices has greatly enriched people’s
lives in this digital era. As the dominator of current mobile
device market, Android reserves over 82.8% of the entire
smartphone market share [1]. Andy Rubin, the VP of Google
stated on his twitter that the number of Android devices
activated per day has reach 1.3 millions in past few years [2].
The global gross shipments of Android devices is expected
to grow from 1.2 billion in 2015 to 1.54 billions in 2019
[3]. The over-reliance on mobile devices makes people save
all the data regardless of personal or business purpose onto
their smartphone or tablet, which may lead their privacy under
exposure if no proper protection has been enforced.
Android is well-known by its rich functionality and cus-
tomisation, but there are still some requirements which cannot
be implemented by using the official APIs. Google creates a
collection of permission labels to define the privilege of apps
running on Android OS. Some actions like reading the content
displaying on the screen, in another word taking screenshot,
was marked as signature level permission, hence are not
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allowed to be realised by the third party application. As long
as the requirement of users exists, the developers would never
stop to push the boundary. For that reason, developers are all
motivated and successfully come up with two approaches to
solve the permission dilemma, namely “rooting the phone”
and “ADB workaround”.
Rooting the devices could enable users to gain the ad-
ministration privileges to do anything they want such as
removing pre-installed apps, unlocking more functionalities,
or sometimes just simply changing the theme of UI. According
to a statistic done by Kristijan Lucic in 2014 [4], there
are over 27.44% users indicating that they have rooted their
smartphones to remove redundant and useless pre-installed
applications. However, there are several security issues behind
the “rooting” because it disables the permission mechanism on
Android system.
The good news says there is an increasing number of people
who have realised the risk and danger of rooting their devices,
and has started seeking non-root approaches. Gaining system
privilege through Android Debug Bridge (ADB) is one of the
best known and widely used workarounds. Users can connect
their devices to a PC via either USB or wireless network,
launch the ADB and then invoke a service with system level
privilege running in the background. After that, an application
could communicate with that service, send command to it,
and thereby trigger it to work for the application with system
privilege. In this manner, that app can do the job even without
APIs provided by Android, any time and anywhere unless
being powered off.
There are plenty of apps on Google Play Store adopting
this ADB workaround to satisfy users’ specific needs which
are not provided with APIs by Android OS, including, but
not limited to, performing backup and restoration, taking
screenshot, recording screen, etc. Those apps using ADB
workaround to achieve high privilege are very popular and
some of them has millions users.
The security of ADB workaround has been raised up after
some exploitation being successfully conducted. It is critical
because it refers to the privacy of millions of Android users.
In this project, we design an approach to discover the vul-
nerabilities of ADB workaround and implement a solution to
detect the privilege leakage. We apply this approach to three
real-world apps downloaded from Google Play Store, analyse
them and eventually discover the privilege leakage on each
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of three apps by using the tool we implemented. In addition,
we conduct an exploitation on one of these three apps named
“No Root Screenshot It” and successfully prove the existence
of vulnerabilities that we have recently found. Last but not
least, we provide some advice to the developers to help them
achieve users’ requirement and meanwhile protect users’ data
and privacy.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Privilege & Permission on Android
Privilege is a security attribute required for certain opera-
tions. In Unix-like operation system, the process privileges are
organised in shape of a flat tree, where the users’ privilege
is presented as the leaves and the superuser is described as
root [5]. Android, as a mobile operation system built based
on Unix/Linux, takes advantage of the user-based protection
to identify and isolate the resources used by applications. All
applications on Android run within the application sandbox
and only have limited permissions to access resources which
have declared in advance [6].
Similar to other Unix-like operating systems, Android also
has the superuser-level privilege called root that has full access
to all apps’ data. By default, only a small subset of the core
applications run with system or signature permissions, and
most of the apps downloaded from the Google Play Store
only request the user-level permissions such as access to the
Internet, hardware sensor and camera. Android OS does not
prevent users or applications with the root permission from
accessing and even modifying the other applications even it is
not encouraged [6].
Besides employing underlying Unix-like privilege system,
Android also has its own privilege management mechanism,
which is also known as permission levels. On Android plat-
form, permissions are classified into several protection lev-
els. Most of the Android developers are made available to
either the “normal” level permissions or the “dangerous”
level permissions in their development. The normal level
permissions, such as Internet, vibration, NFC or setting alarm,
are considered as having no great risk to the user’s privacy
or security. Those permissions will not prompt the user to
grant permission if properly declared in manifest during the
development. The dangerous level permissions indicate that
the application needs access to private data or control over
the device that may potentially have a negative impact to
user. Unlike the normal level, all the operations classified
in dangerous level will not be executed until obtaining user
consent. In addition to normal level and dangerous level,
there are two more protection levels namely signature level
and signature or system level defining risky permissions. The
former is only granted to the applications signed by a trusted
party like Android development group. The latter could only
be granted to the apps that are embedded in Android system
image or signed by vendors of the system image [7]. The grant
of these two permission levels is not to be approved by users,
instead, it is conducted by signature validation mechanism of
Andorid system during installation [8]. Many functions that
users require but not provided as public APIs by Android
OS, like backing up, taking screenshot and screen recording,
belong to the signature level permission.
TABLE I
EXAMPLES OF signature-LEVEL PERMISSIONS NOT GRANTED TO THE
THIRD PARTY DEVELOPERS
Permission Description
CALL_PRIVILEGED Initiate a call without user confir-
mation
CAPTURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT Capture video output stream
DELETE_CACHE_FILES Delete cache files
DELETE_PACKAGE Uninstall package
INSTALL_PACKAGES Install packages
READ_FRAME_BUFFER Access to the frame buffer data
(e.g. screenshot)
READ_LOGS Read system log files
REBOOT Reboot the system
SET_TIME Set system time
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS Overwrite APN setting
B. Privilege Escalation
In order to implement the function like backup, taking
screenshot or screen recording, developers have to find a way
to escalate the privilege of their apps to the signature level
or higher. There are two privilege escalation approaches on
Android, namely rooting and non-root workarounds.
1) Rooting: The word “root” may not be a strange term to
an Android player. Rooting is the process of allowing users
of Android devices to attain privileged control, which is also
known as the root access [9]. The rooting process grants users
with superuser level permissions to use their devices, which
could provide users a ton of customizations and opportunities
to exhaust the functionality of Android OS. However, besides
the risks of voiding warranty and bricking the devices, rooting
an Android device could also expose all the data and program
to the adversary and bring severe security vulnerabilities [10].
The rooting process varies with hardware manufacture and
system version, but generally speaking, there are three steps
to root an Android device, including unlocking Bootloader,
flashing custom Recovery ROM, and lastly, installing SuperSU
[11]. Once an Android device is rooted, users can access and
modify the system resource. Furthermore, user can customize
privilege and assign to any application installed on the rooted
device.
2) Non-root Alternative: Rooting Android device is a risky
practice because it may void the warranty, brick the device
and bring with numerous security vulnerabilities. Therefore,
developers start to seek non-root alternatives to escalate privi-
lege. There is an alternative approach called ADB workaround
to attain high level privilege without rooting the device, and it
becomes popular whilst the growth of users’ concern to their
device security.
Take the programmatic screenshot as an example. An app
needs to have a signature-level permission from the system to
take screenshot, which is impossible for normal developers to
obtain through normal level permission request in interface.
However, there are still two workarounds even without the
concession from Android development team: (1) taking screen-
shot on rooted devices; or (2) making use of a process with
higher privilege to escalate the privilege of the app. The latter
approach does not require the holistic change to the Android
devices like “rooting”, and has better security and reliability
[12].
ADB is a development tool provided by Google to allow
developers to debug apps shell in the Android devices from
their PCs. A process requiring signature-level permissions,
such as taking screenshot or backup, is not allowed to be
implemented in app by third party developers, but could be
started from a ADB shell window [12]. That is the reason
why ADB workaround could achieve higher privilege. Using
ADB workaround, developers could implement all methods
requiring signature-level permissions, pack all of them into
a executive that could be started on ADB and run them in
the background of Android OS as a service until being killed
(e.g. power-off, restart). Thus the unprivileged App could
communicate with the privileged proxy to indirectly achieve
the functionality that may not able to be done on unprivileged
App only.
C. Reverse Engineering on Android
Reverse engineering, also known as back engineering, is
defined by Wikipedia as “the term describing processes of
extracting knowledge or design information from an existing
product and reproducing based on the extracted knowledge or
design information with personal modification” [13].
The Apps on Android are mainly written in Java and
HTML5/CSS, packaged in format of APK and executed on
the virtual machine called Dalvik (DVM). Unlike Java Virtual
Machine (JVM), the DVM uses a single Dalvik executive
(DEX) file with different data structures and opcodes rather
than a jar file compressing multiple Java classes together.
Besides that, the JVM is a stack-based machine but DVM is
designed as a register-based machine. For those reasons, the
decompilation and reverse engineering on Android are more
complicated and more challenging than doing the same things
on Java code [14].
There are some tools designed for easy decompilation of
Android Apps being made available to the public for free.
For example, Apktool1 is a very useful tool providing smali
assembler and disassembler for APK files, thereby facilitate
to modify an app and repackage it [15]. Another tool called
dex2jar2 allows users to convert APK back into a jar file,
which could be easily further into Java codes by using Java
decompiler such as JD-GUI3 [14].
Most developers do not want the reverse engineering hap-
pened onto their products. Techniques like obfuscation could
help developers to make the code unreadable before it being
released to the market to prevent reverse engineering. A
tool named ProGuard has been integrated into the Android
build system by Google to help users shrinks, optimizes, and
1Apktool is available on http://ibotpeaches.github.io/apktool/
2dex2jar is available on https://sourceforge.net/projects/dex2jar/
3JD-GUI is available on http://jd.benow.ca/
Fig. 1. Example of Hooking Process: An Imaginary Screenshot App
obfuscates the code [16]. Another tool DexGuard, which is a
premium version of ProGuard, are widely used by commercial
organisations and enterprises because it offers more advanced
features to protect Android Apps from both static and dynamic
analysis [17].
D. Instrumentation
There are two famous alternatives of frameworks that
achieve hooking on Andorid. One of them is an open-source
frameworks called Xposed4. Another well-known framework
is Substrate5 which is not open-sourced but has better docu-
mented API. Both of them have similar functions and work
based on a similar mechanism as well [18]. Xposed is more
prevalent in the research field and developers community.
There are over 800 modules implemented based on Xposed
framework available to the public for free on Xposed Module
Repository [19].
The core of Android runtime is the process called Zy-
gote. Each application is executed in form of a copy of
Zygote, which is also known as “fork”. When an Android
device is booted, a script named “init.rc” is started,
followed by loading all necessary classes and methods
by “/system/bin/app_process”. When Xposed comes
into play, an extended startup app process is copied to the
“/system/bin” and then be started during the booting. In
this way, Xposed can inject that extended startup process into
the DVM instance, before each main method being called
and invoked. Xposed provides a private and native method
named hookMethodNative which is implemented within
extended app process. It could change the method type to
“native”, and then onload its own implementation to that
“native” method. Each method being hooked by Xposed will
be converted into a “native” one, and the actual method being
called could be treated as a brand new method with original
implementation and overrided hook handling code written by
Xposed framework developer [20].
Hooking usually happened before or after the execution of
target methods. A hook module could not only record and log
4Xposed is available on http://repo.xposed.info/
5Cydia Substrate is available on http://www.cydiasubstrate.com/
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Fig. 2. Approach of App Analysis
all the data sending in and passing out the target methods, but
also alter the behaviour of target methods by modifying its
parameters or return value [21]. Therefore a dynamic analysis
by Xposed hooking could help us to sketch out the data flow
of a program. Figure 1 shows an example of hooking process
onto an imaginary screenshot app. Hooking by using Xposed
module could not only obtained the data flows within a running
app, but also alter its behaviour by modifying return value.
III. APPROACH & CASE STUDIES
A. Approach
The apps using ADB workaround is usually a combination
of a normal app with all functions being restricted at normal
or dangerous level permission, and a proxy started by ADB
and therefore has signature level permission on Android. In
Android, most of apps communicates with proxies through
socket channel, which has no strong protection and generic
access control. A malicious app could easily obtain the control
of proxy if it knows the protocol of communication between
app and it. Whether the interface of the proxy is protected to
prevent from third party access is the first potential issue.
Some apps implement password authentication into the pro-
tocol to strengthen protection to the proxy. However, because
of the inconsistency of app and proxy’s life cycles, there must
be a mechanism to temporarily save the password. By this
means, a malicious app could still have chance to know the
password if proper analysis has been done. Therefore, whether
the protection is effective and secure enough is the second
potential issue.
The approach to analyse the app and find the vulnerabilities
of ADB workaround is initiated based on two potential issues
we have mentioned recently, and targeted to exploit if any
vulnerability has been found. We summarised this approach
into four step:
(1) an analysis on the proxy activation; This analysis
could be done on reading proxy activation script if exists. The
script could be either in batch file or bash script depends on
which OS, Windows or Linux, to be run. Some apps do not
provide script file to the user for Windows OS, for instead,
a desktop application with UI is provided to achieve better
user experience. In this circumstance, the Linux version of
activation package is recommended to be download because
script file is more widely used and possibly given on Linux OS.
A simple and clear script file could disclose some details of
the protocol of communication between app and proxy, such as
the name of service proxy, the native executive file of proxy if
any, and how the service being activated. Besides the analysis
onto the script file, the name, process ID and permission
group of service proxy running in the background could also
be found by typing command “adb shell ps” in ADB
through USB to the device. Moreover, the port opened for
the communication between service proxy and app could be
found in similar way by typing ADB command “adb shell
netstat” to retrieve all active network usage on the device.
However, in this step, the pairing of process and specific port
listening may not be able to be observed if multiple proxies
had been activated, like the scenario during the case study of
app III.
(2) an analysis on the APK file; Concept of reverse
engineering will be involved in this step like APK decom-
pilation. Once the service proxy and port number have been
identified, the next step is to discover the implementation of
the communication between proxy and app in APK file. The
APK file could be unpackaged and decompiled into smali/Java
source code or assembly code, by using tools like Apktool or
dex2jar. The smali/Java code has supreme readability which
may help us to look through different classes to locate the
code of protocol’s implementation. In fact, the decompilation
analysis may not always to be proved as a smooth and
easy process because most of developers obfuscated their
code before releasing the APK file to the app Store. In this
situation, the disassembly will be helpful and a supplement
to the samli/Java code reading. Reading assembly code could
help us recognise the constant strings and numbers defined
within same class. For example, the magic number used for
authentication in app II, which is 89234820, was found in
this manner.
(3) an dynamic analysis; Only reading the script and source
code may not be sufficient to sketch out the entire protocol
between proxy and app. The objective of dynamic analysis is
to find both control flow and data flow occurred when the app
interacts with service proxy. Reading logs through logcat
is a simple but effective way to gain a brief understanding
to the protocol. However, hooking by Xposed framework will
be one of the best solution to complete the analysis when the
source code has been enforced with strict obfuscation or an
authentication has been applied onto the socket channel be-
tween app and proxy server. Hooking method could be forced
onto the key methods in class(es) in charge of communication
between app and proxy which has been discovered in last
step, then sniff and extract the arguments passed in and return
value through the system logs. According to the case studies
in this project, the methods to be hooked are mostly used to
handle the action trigger (e.g. takeScreenshot) and socket
channel I/O (e.g. write). Hooking on the prior method(s) by
printing logs could show us the control flow of the protocol,
and hooking on the latter method(s) by extracting arguments’
value could help us understand the data flow between service
proxy and app itself. By now with both control flow and data
flow confirmed, the protocol between service proxy and app,
which used to escalate privilege on Android OS, has been
unveiled.
Screenshot Application
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Fig. 3. Classification of Mainstream Screenshot Apps on Google Play Store
(4) authentication analysis if any; There is very possibly
an authentication process if any series of numbers or a random
string was found in the data flow of the protocol. In that case,
it is encouraged to clarify if the password a constant (like app
II) or dynamic (like app III); then followed by determining
relationship between the password and life cycle of app or/and
proxy(s) if the password is found to be dynamic. For the
dynamic password, if the password change is triggered by
proxy and independent of app itself, the password is generally
stored at somewhere that the app has permission to read;
otherwise the password itself or the mechanism of its changing
should be able to be found in app’s source code.
Once these four steps listed above have been fully under-
stood, attackers are theoretically able to exploit an app that
uses ADB workaround in a programmatic manner. In the later
part of this section, case studies on three apps using ADB
workaround will be analysed and one of them will be exploited
by apply this approach.
B. Case Studies
A group of screenshot apps with the highest popularity
and the most recent updates were chosen from the Google
Play Store. There are altogether 13 screenshot apps being
downloaded from Google Play Store and installed on testing
Android devices. We have run all of them by following
their instruction, observed the outcomes, and recorded all
key information. The statistics of those 13 screenshot apps
could be found in Table V in appendix of this report. After
reviewing all 13 screenshot apps, as shown in Figure 3,
a simple classification were been made according to their
functionality. These apps were firstly be separated accord-
ing to their compatibility with un-rooted devices. 5 apps
has instruction saying that they only support rooted devices.
Among the 8 apps which works on un-rooted devices, 6 apps
could only take screenshot by pressing hard-key combination
(usually power key + volume down key), which may vary with
configuration of manufactures, This method almost works on
Android OS version 4.0 and later versions only [22]. Two apps
left, Screenshot Ultimate developed by “icecoldapps” (noted as
app I) and No Root Screenshot It developed by “edwardkim”
Fig. 4. Steps to Find Unrooted Screenshot Method in App I
(noted as app II) , has been found using ADB workaround to
take screenshot and selected in case studies.
Unlike taking screenshot, screen recording is the function
that users could not obtain by either third party apps without
signature level permission, or any solution provided by An-
droid OS. Keyword “screen recording” has been searched on
Google Play Store. The number of apps found is much less
than the searching result of “screenshot”. However, most of
screen recording apps are using ADB workaround to achieve
its functionality. In this project, one recording app, FREE
screen recorder NO ROOT developed by “Invisibility Ltd”
(Noted as app III), has also been chosen and analysed in case
studies.
1) App I – “Screenshot Ultimate”: “Screenshot Ultimate”
is one typical screenshot app that does not require a rooted de-
vice. It supports screenshot taking through ADB workaround.
However, it is not like the deal above board since too ob-
vious instruction may bring Google’s restriction. The ADB
workaround is mentioned in a paragraph of “Help” instruction,
and the URL to download the script and other necessary files
are given in another place and could only be found in “Setting”
→ “Capture Methods” → “Manual”. Overall, it is still kind
of good experience because of detailed step-by-step instruction
and troubleshooting notes.
Analysis of ADB Channel
The native executable file, named “screenshotulti
-matenative1”, and scripts for both Linux and Windows
OS have been downloaded as a zipped file from the URL
given in the help instruction. After reading through the script
file, the flow of service activation has been summarized and
shown in Figure 5. With the process name of service running
in the background, what we are going to do is to analyse the
APK file and unveil the protocol of screenshot taking process
between app and that service.
Decompilation of APK
TABLE II
APPS HAVE BEEN STUDIED IN THIS PROJECT
Name Description Size Identity Package Name
Screenshot Ultimate Screenshot 3.2M com.icecoldapps.screenshotultimate
No Root Screenshot It Screenshot 838k com.edwardkim. android.screenshotitfullnoroot
FREE screen recorder NO ROOT Recording 7.4M uk.org.invisibility.recordablefree
Fig. 5. Proxy Activation of App I
The APK file is generated from Java code through a
systematic routine which might be easy to be analysed when
compared with the native executable. APK file could be
downloaded by searching the mirror site of Google Play Store6
or extracted by using specific apps like “APK Extractor”7.
Once the APK file has been obtained, the decompilation could
be done for analysis purpose.
The reverse engineering tool “dex2jar” has been used to
decompile the APK file to the jar format. Then further Java
decompilation has been done by “JD-GUI”. So far, the original
source code should be perfectly reversed if there is no ex-
ception happened due to code obfuscation or other protection
mechanism. Unfortunately, the class organisation of the code
obtained from the decompilation of “Screenshot Ultimate”
is not quite readable because the obfuscation is believed to
be applied. Some core methods which control the logic flow
of screenshot taking are missing. Clues could only be found
by analysing package structure, libraries imported and source
code from the remaining classes.
ASL Library & Static Analysis of Socket Channel
Obfuscation cannot perfectly hide everything in the
decompiled source code. After carefully reading through
6http://www.apkmirror.com/
7Apk Extractor could be downloaded at https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.ext.ui&hl=en
the source code of “Screenshot Ultimate”, we found some
hints to shape the mechanism of screenshot taking. For
example, there was an address in Android OS partition
“/system/bin/fbread” appearing more than once
in the obfuscated classes, just like the code snippet
(com.icecoldapps.screenshotultimate.an)
shown below:
for (;;)
{
if (!this.k)
{
if (!this.l) {
break label470;
}
throw new Exception(this.m);
t = "/system/bin/fbread";
break;
}
try
{
Thread.sleep(200L);
}
catch (Exception paramContext) {}
}
The occurrence of “/system/bin/fbread” suggests
that this app was very likely taking screenshot by reading
image data from framebuffer, which is commonly expressed
as short writing “fb” in Android development.
Many apps take screenshots by using a library called An-
droid screenshot library (known as “ASL”)8 A comparison has
been done between the native executive provided by both ASL
and “Screenshot Ultimate” to validate that presumption. The
exact equivalence in file checksum value among two native
executives as shown in Figure 6 indicates that the “Screenshot
Ultimate” is one of the third party apps that take screenshot
by invoking ASL APIs on unrooted devices.
Fig. 6. Checksum of Native Executive Files from App I & ASL
8Android screenshot library is available at https://code.google.com/archive/
p/android-screenshot-library/downloads
Fig. 7. Process of Application Taking Screenshot of App I
The ASL enables Android developer to write screenshot
app without root requirement. Once the user followeds the
instruction and executed the native executive file by run-
ning the given scripts, proxy with shell permission could
help user take screenshot which the application has no
privilege to do so. Take “Screenshot Ultimate” as exam-
ple, user could just click the “Screenshot” button when
user want to take screenshot of his/her device, then the
app send the screenshot command to the proxy running in
background via socket channel, following by the proxy as
a process named “screenshotultimatenative1” read-
ing the current hardware framebuffer, converting to the image
format and saving to the specific location.
Hence the protocol of communication between app and
proxy won’t be difficult to be sketched out. After writing a
demo app using ASL API and running on the test devices,
the result of screenshot taking was proved to be same as
“Screenshot Ultimate”. The communication protocol to take
a screenshot by invoking ASL library was shown in Figure 7.
2) App II – “No Root Screentshot It”: Similar with the
“Screenshot Ultimate”, “No Root Screenshot It” is another
screenshot app does not require rooting the devices. However,
what makes “No Root Screenshot It” unique is the strong
security and protection enforcement have been done during
the development. Obfuscation has been conducted onto both
service activator and APK. Meanwhile, the communication
channel between app and proxy has also been protected by
using some identification trick like a password, which will be
pointed out later.
Analysis of ADB Channel
The service activation has been done by executing a .Net
application named “Screenshot It Enabler” rather than simply
running a batch script. Therefore the analysis of the service
activation will be more complicated because it is involved with
the decompilation of .Net application. Moreover, the script file
was not found in the enabler’s package, which means it has
been packaged into the APK and the purpose of the enabler
is just to run the “shell” command to execute it.
In this project, a .Net decompilation tool named “JetBrains
Fig. 8. Proxy Activation of App II
dotPeek”9 has been used to do the reverse engineering of the
activation tool. Even though the enabler application has been
obfuscated, some variables and C# code logics could still be
recovered after the decompilation. The scripts to enable the
proxy has been unveiled by observing the C# code from the
decompilation result. In addition, the file name of the script
could be confirmed as “screenshot” in this way. Then the
script file’s location could be easily found by browsing the
file manager on a rooted phone, or by decompiling the APK
file to search the file name. The code snippet providing key
clue is indicated below.
startInfo2.FileName = "adb.exe";
startInfo2.Arguments = "shell /data/data/" + this.
↪→ b + "/screenshot daemon";
Static Analysis of Socket Channel
After clarifying the ADB communication to activate the
proxy, the following steps will focus on discovering the
communication between app and the proxy, thereby obtain
the command(s) to control proxy to take screenshot at any
occasion. On the APK side, obfuscation has been down very
strongly onto both class names and variable names, which
makes it impossible to observe the entire protocol by just
reading the decompiled Java code. It is cleared that the class
named ScreenshotService is in charge of the commu-
nication with the proxy but the code is not as readable as the
previous one Screenshot Ultimate. What makes things worse
is that one magic number, 89234820, being found and being
referenced multiple times by reading through the assembly
code of ScreenshotService class. For this reason, it is
proved that there is a great possibility that the app having
(1) multiple communication session with proxy to take a
screenshot; and/or (2) an authentication trick to indicate the
app’s identity, which might be the reason of the existence of
the magic number 89234820.
0xfe04: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
↪→ 00 00 |................|
9dotPeek is available on https://www.jetbrains.com/decompiler/
Fig. 9. Process of Application Taking Screenshot of App II
0xfe14: 38 39 32 33 34 38 32 30 00 00 00 00 00 00
↪→ 00 00 |89234820........|
0xfe24: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
↪→ 00 00 |................|
Dynamic Analysis of Socket Channel
Unlike what we have done in case study of app I, only
static analysis is not adequate to find the protocol that used for
communication between “No Root Screentshot It” and proxy.
In order to unveil what kind of command that the app has
sent to the proxy to take screenshot and how they interact with
each other, a dynamic analysis technique called “hooking” was
brought in this project.
Hooking system APIs on Android could be enabled by
using a framework known as Xposed on a rooted device.
By reading the decompiled code during the static analysis,
the communication between proxy and app has been found
conducted through socket channel of Android. Therefore, the
monitoring of the socket channel during the communication
between app and proxy could be done by writing a module
based on Xposed framework which hook all the socket channel
related packet data IO functions.
TABLE III
METHODS HOOKED IN APP II DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Class Name Method Name
screenShotServiceClass takeScreenshot1
screenShotServiceClass read
screenShotServiceClass write
1 The takeScreenshot was hooked to indicate the be-
ginning of communication.
After deploying the Xposed module named “hookNo-
RootScreenshotIt”, all the necessary data have been logged
and printed out during the IO operation of the socket channel.
The control flow of the app and proxy communication has
been finally unveiled and shown in Figure 9.
3) App III – “FREE screen recorder NO ROOT”: In
addition to screenshot apps, a screen recording app named
“FREE screen recorder NO ROOT” has also been analysed
in this project. According to the description on the Google
Play Store, this app could enable users to record their screen
regardless of which app or activity is on the top of stack,
and then export the video recorded as MP4 format. The entire
process doesn’t request users to root their devices.
Proxy Service Identification
Similar with those two screenshot apps we have analysed
previously, this app III also requires users to complete the
proxy activation before the app unlocking the record function.
However, this activation process on Windows OS is executed
by running an exe file, and the same process on Linux OS is
also started by a well compiled and packaged jar file, which
makes the analysis on the proxy activation very difficult.
> adb shell ps
USER PID PPID VSIZE RSS WCHAN PC
↪→ NAME
......
shell 26757 1 1084 240 c06f020c
↪→ b6ef8500 S
/data/data/uk.org.invisibility.recordablefree/
↪→ files/inputserv
shell 26760 1 1076 188 c06f020c
↪→ b6f01500 S
/data/data/uk.org.invisibility.recordablefree/
↪→ files/videoserv
Missing of activation script doesn’t mean the identification
of proxy is impossible. Actually, with the help of ADB, we
could still find the details proxy(s) activated, including the
process name, PID and the port(s) listening. Here, two ADB
commends, “ps” and “netstat”, have been used to retrieve
the list of running processes and active ports on the Android
device. By this means the proxy and the ports number could
be found. There are two services namely “videoserv” and
“inputserv” running on the background to enable users to
record their screen. One of them uses port 7938, and the other
one uses port 7940 to communicate with app.
> adb shell netstat
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign
↪→ Address State
......
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:7938 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN
tcp 0 0 0.0.0.0:7940 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN
Decompilation
By now we have still yet to connect all the clues found
in that last step because the port(s) listening did not tell us
which services they are belonging to. For that reason, the
decompilation is needed for the further analysis.
Firstly, the APK file has been extracted out of the device,
and then been decompiled into samli code. The clues that
recently found, two port numbers 7938 and 7940, could be
searched within the source code to locate the key classes we
will analyse on. As the searching result of keyword 7938
shown below, we found the variable name which bearing
that port number, namely “video_port”. Similarly, the
port 7940 has been found in variable name “input_port”
recorded in same xml file.
user{at}ubuntu:$ grep -rnw ’/home/user/Documents/
↪→ Recordable Free/’ -e "7938"
/home/user/Documents/Recordable Free/res/values/
↪→ integers.xml:6:
<integer name="video\textunderscore port">7938</
↪→ integer>
Next, we continued searching the occurrence of two vari-
ables “video_port” and “audio_port”. After filtering
from the search result, we preliminarily confirmed that the
code reflecting the control flow and data flow was located in
class “RecordService” and “Projection” separately.
Take the communication between video server and app as
example, the core function in charge of the communication
flow is supposed to be “videoWrite”, which located in
line 1038 in the smali code of RecordService. This
videoWrite method has been called many time once after
the occurrence of the constant string with all letter being
capitalised, which is suspected to be the command sending to
the server. Moreover, by browsering through the smali code,
a method named “openSocket” has been called within the
class RecordService, which helps us to come up with a
presumption that the protocol we are going to discover was
achieved through socket channel.
.line 1038
const-string v1, "AUTH "
invoke-virtual {p0, v1},
Luk/org/invisibility/recorder/service/
↪→ RecordService;
->videoWrite(Ljava/lang/String;)V
.line 1036
const-string v1, "127.0.0.1"
invoke-virtual {p0}, Luk/org/invisibility/recorder
↪→ /service/RecordService;
->getResources()Landroid/content/res/Resources;
move-result-object v5
sget v6, Luk/org/invisibility/recorder/core/
↪→ R$integer;->video_port:I
invoke-virtual {v5, v6}, Landroid/content/res/
↪→ Resources;->getInteger(I)I
move-result v5
invoke-static {v1, v5}, Luk/org/invisibility/
↪→ recorder/service/RecordService;
->openSocket(Ljava/lang/String;I)I
move-result v1
iput v1, p0, Luk/org/invisibility/recorder/service
↪→ /RecordService;
->mVideoReadFd:I
Dynamic Analysis on Socket Channel
Like what we have done onto the app II, hooking by exposed
is always considered the most convenient and effective way
to sketch out the complete control flow and data flow of the
protocol. The target function to be hooked has been confirmed
during the previous analysis, which is “videoWrite” lo-
cated in class named “RecordService”. In order to find
as many details about the protocol as possible, some other
methods located in the same class of “videoWrite” have
also been hooked and shown in Table IV. With the information
obtained from the output logs of methods’ hooking, the
protocol of the communication between video server and app
to start screen recording has been found and displayed as
Figure 10.
TABLE IV
METHODS HOOKED IN APP III DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Class Name Method Name
RecordService videoWrite
RecordService writeCaptureOption
RecordService startListen
RecordService stopListen
RecordService startCountdown
RecordService startRecord
RecordService stopRecord
Poaching the Passcode
A sixteen-digit-long string ce2757a06d455af2 as
showed in Figure 10 grabbed our attentions because it was
presumed to be the authentication code, or password for short,
according to the location of its occurrence. Nevertheless, it has
not yet been confirmed to be a string constant or a dynamic
changing string so far. In order to clarify the nature of that
password, a series of experiments has been conducted.
Firstly, we close the app after taking a screen record-
ing video clips, then re-opened it and took another screen
recording. Hooking logs shown in logcat console showed that
the password did’t change. In that means, the password is
independent of app’s life-cycle. We have repeated the above
steps for many times and all the results proved the conclusion
is correct. Next, we killed all proxies related to this app and did
the service activation again. The purpose of this experiment is
to determine if the password is independent of the life cycle of
proxies. If answer is yes, that means this password is generated
by one of the proxies, and will keep updating each time re-
activating the proxies, such as rebooting the device. On the
contrary, the password would be confirmed to be a constant,
which is same as the magic number in the case study of app II,
if there is no evidence indicating that the password itself varies
with different instance of proxy. After many times repeating
the above steps, the password was found changed each time
we re-activate the proxies.
Since the password is proved to be generated by proxy, there
must be a place that the proxy stored the code at somewhere
that the app with user privilege could access and read. This
idea was generated by recalling the analysis on a backup app
called “Helium” in paper of Bai et al. [23]. After a series of
searching initiated by this idea, we finally located the password
in a log file named videoserv.log under the directory
data/local/tmp, and luckily found the first occurrence
of the current password was always after the word “AUTH”
in the log file. For that reason, the attackers could all along
hold the current password by writing a simple code snippet
on Android to read the log file and then extract the string at
given location.
...
12618: ready (1408)
12618: client_read_fd: 4
Post-recording
Recording
Pre-recording
Recordable Free App
Proxy Service
(videosvr)
User
Start/resume
save the 
recording
open
authentication
acknowledgment
configuration 
& start
termination
start Recording
stop Recording
3
1
2
1
AUTH
ce2757a06d455af2
VERSION
PROBE /storage/emulated/legacy/
TEST Swap
EXIT
2
SET VideoScale SCALE_FULL
AUTH
ce2757a06d455af2
SET MaxHeight 1080
SET FrameRate 8
SET VideoBitrate 3200
SET AudioBitrate 64
SET GestureColor #ffff00ff
SET UseHW HARDWARE_YES
SET ClampMode CLAMP_NONE
SET VideoMode 2
SET RGBSwap NONE
SET XYSwap NONE
SET VideoDiff FALSE
SET LongGOP FALSE
SET Orientation 0
/storage/emulated/legacy/Record
3
STOP
PING
EXIT
Fig. 10. Process of Screen Recording on App III
12618: client_write_fd: 4
12618: AUTH 01c5cdf96b5a2a63 (1422)
12618: cmd_auth (1072)
12618: key accepted (1076)
12618: SET VideoScale SCALE_FULL (1422)
...
IV. EXPLOITATION
The processes of privilege escalation in three apps have
been completely unveiled during the analysis and described
in last section. Theoretically speaking, if there is a malicious
app being installed on your device while the proxy running
in background of OS, behaving exactly same as the original
screenshot app, it can unperceivably steal the screenshot of
your device at any time on any occasion. In this project, the
app II is chosen to be conducted an exploitation to prove the
privacy vulnerabilities of ADB workaround.
Unlike the back-up app named Helium mentioned in the
paper of Bai, et al. [23], app II doesn’t implement a dynamic
identity schemes. That means the exploitation of app II in this
project, could be conducted in a very straight forward manner.
Besides that, the malicious app could also co-exist with the
genuine App. In this section, the exploitation processes of app
II will be introduced and the outcome of exploitation will be
shown at the end of this section.
An app named “exploitNoRootScreenshotIt” simulating the
malicious exploitation of the app II had been implemented
for the demonstration purpose. In that exploitation app, there
are in total four messages being organized into two lots and
sent out to the localhost on port 6003 through Android’s
socket channel. The first two messages are used for the
configuration purpose, and the last two messages are sent out
as screenshot taking command once the acknowledgement of
first batch messages have been received from the proxy, which
Fig. 11. Sequence Diagram of Exploitation of App II
is “screenshotService” running in the background. The
entire process was displayed in Figure 11.
The screenshot obtained is converted to a bmp file un-
der the sub-directory named “temp”10. The access permis-
sion of that folder was set as read-only to the user group.
Therefore, once the screenshot has been taken by the proxy,
the exploitation app could access to the newly captured
screenshot located in the “temp” folder and make a copy
to the target location such as folder under external storage
“/sdcard/hack_screenshots/”.
The screenshot image is renamed according to the capture
time to avoid being overwritten and convenient maintenance
10The full directory path is /data/data/com.edwardkim.android.screenshot
itfullnoroot/temp
Fig. 12. Steps to Take a Screenshot in Exploitation App
at the same time. The exploitation has been tested on two
devices (one Nexus 7 and one Xiaomi Rednote 3G ) and
worked well just like the genuine app “No Root Screenshot
It”. This exploitation could even been further designed and
programmed to take screenshot automatically with specific
frequency without any notice of user, the user’s privacy could
be consequently exposed to attacker.
V. RELATED WORK
There are some previous studies unveiling the security
risk of ADB workaround despite it is considered much safer
than device rooting. Security concern of ADB workaround
mainly comes from the difference between roles of proxy and
application on Android OS. In this project, these risks could
be summarised into two types –
(1) whether other apps could send commend to the opening
proxy; and –
(2) whether the communication between app and proxy is
properly protected if the scenario of (1) is possible to happen.
The description of the first kind of security concern could be
found in the paper written in 2014 by Lin, et al. The commu-
nication channel between the application and its ADB proxy
relies on network sockets without any protection enforced.
For that reason, once an ADB proxy has been activated, any
application has the privilege to communicate with it and even
request service from it at any time without restrictions. This
vulnerability gives attackers a chance to analyse the protocol
of such communication and build a malicious application to
request service from ADB proxy exactly as same as what
genuine application does [12].
Some developers have realised the fact that the commu-
nication channel between the application and ADB proxy
may be risky, and therefore implemented some authentication
routines to strengthen security. However in the paper of Bai,
et al, it was proved that such authentication was ineffective
as long as the reverse engineering and analysis being feasible
on given application. What developer can do to secure the
communication is only applying some basic authentication
since there is no way to enforce strong protection onto the
socket network. That authentication is usually very weak
in front of analysis [23]. Some application like “Helium”,
a backup/restore application mentioned in the paper written
by Bai, et al., has been found using protection during the
communication between application and ADB proxy. ADB
proxy requests a password that sent out from a specific
process to provide service. Unfortunately, vulnerability was
found in the protocol of password distribution. The password
generated each time when ADB proxy being activated, and it
is independent of app’s life cycle. In this way, the proxy has
to find a place that readable by apps executed with user group
privilege, save the password into a file and waiting for app
to read from it. This life cycle inconsistency makes adversary
possible to find the current using password and thereby exploit
the genuine app by writing another app following exactly same
protocol in communication with the ADB proxy.
VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this project, we have come up with an approach to find
security vulnerabilities of ADB workaround. By conducting
case studies on three different apps, we found most of apps
using ADB workaround have risk of being exploited. Followed
by case studies, an exploitation has been done successfully,
which proves and verifies the approach we have summarised
in the analysis.
This project could be treated as not only a support to those
previous studies on the similar field, but also a reference to
the Android developers. The successful exploitation in this
project is sufficient to show that the security and protection
enforcement of the Android apps during design and develop-
ment periods is crucial to users’ privacy and doomed to be an
endless and challenging journey.
Some suggestions on Android development have been sum-
marised throughout the study and research in this project. The
Android developers are advised to raise security awareness and
take some security practices into account when implementing
the functionality based on ADB workaround, including:
1) Access control for socket channel communication.
An access control protocol is strongly advised to be
implemented on both app and proxy sides. It could be
like exchanging of passcode, to enable the proxy to
validate the identity of app. A good access authentication
should not been exploited by analysing on solely one
side among app and proxy. In this way, the proxy could
reject to provide service when the command received
through socket channel failed to validate the identity of
app. The objective of this advice is to solve the problem
(1) mentioned in Section 5.
2) Identification for application. Only the access control
is not enough to ensure the security when facing to the
second problem described in Section 5. One possible
solution for this issue may be writing a handshake
process in the proxy implementation, to make both app
and proxy exchange their authentication. And the ADB
proxy will execute the commend only after a successful
validation. Thus the proxy service will only accept the
command sent from the exactly same app. Once the app
is removed and re-installed, regardless of genuine app
or malicious app, another handshake validation will be
required thereby to ensure the ADB proxy will not be
misused.
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APPENDIX A
ABBREVIATION
Abbreviation Full Word/Phrase Abbreviation Full Word/Phrase
ADB Android Debug Bridge IPC Inter process communication
API Application Programming Interface JVM Java Virtual Machine
APK Android Application Package NFC Near Field Communication
App Application Software OS Operating System
ASL Android Screenshot Library PC Personal Computer
DEX Dalvik Executable ROM Read-only Memory
DVM Dalvik Virtual Machine UI User Interface
IO Input/Output USB Universal Serial Bus
APPENDIX B
STATISTICS OF SCREENSHOT APPLICATION
TABLE V
STATISTICS OF SCREENSHOT APP ON GOOGLE PLAY STORE
Name Unrooted Method Size Identity Package Name
Screen Capture - Sigourney Hardkey 5.2M com.mobilescreen.capture
Screenshot Easy Hardkey 5.2M com.icecoldapps.screenshoteasy
Screenshot Ultimate ADB 3.2M com.icecoldapps.screenshotultimate
Screenshot Capture Hardkey 3.1M com.tools.screenshot
NoRoot Screenshot Lite N.A.1 545k com.mobikasa.screenshot.lite
Screenshot and Draw N.A. 1.1M com.conditiondelta. screenshotanddraw.trial
Screenshot Hardkey 2.4M com.enlightment.screenshot
Screenshot Hardkey 1.2M com.geekslab.screenshot
Screenshot Hardkey2 4.86M com.icondice.screenshot
Screenshot N.A. 2.3M com.geeksoft.screenshot
Screenshot ER Demo N.A. 3.2M fahrbot.apps.screen.demo
No Root Screenshot It ADB 838k com.edwardkim. android.screenshotitfullnoroot
Screenshot It N.A. 840k com.edwardkim. android.screenshotitfull
1 N.A. indicates that application only work on rooted devices.
2 only compatible with devices made by some fixed manufactures.
APPENDIX C
CODE SNIPPETS OF HOOKING APP II
XposedBridge.log("Loaded app: " + lpparam.packageName);
Log.d("hookEdward", "Loaded app: " + lpparam.packageName);
if (lpparam.packageName.equals("com.edwardkim.android.screenshotitfullnoroot")) {
XposedBridge.log("Screenshot App Found : " + lpparam.packageName);
Class<?> screenShotServiceClass = XposedHelpers
.findClass("com.edwardkim.android.screenshotit.services.ScreenShotService", lpparam.classLoader);
XposedBridge.hookAllMethods(screenShotServiceClass, "read", new XC_MethodHook() {
protected void beforeHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
XposedBridge.log("Before Hooking (r) -- param.args[0] " + param.args[0]);
XposedBridge.log("Before Hooking (r) -- param.args[1] " + new String((byte[]) param.args[1]));
XposedBridge
.log("Before Hooking (r) -- param.args[1] " + new String((byte[]) param.args[1]).length());
}
protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
XposedBridge.log("After Hooking (r) -- param.args[0] " + param.args[0]);
XposedBridge.log("After Hooking (r) -- param.args[1] " + new String((byte[]) param.args[1]));
XposedBridge
.log("After Hooking (r) -- param.args[1] " + new String((byte[]) param.args[1]).length());
}
});
}
